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The Supreme Court, we are told, is-or at least could be-a 
republican schoolmaster,t an educative institution.2 Through its 
decisions and, even more, the written opinions that provide the 
rationales for its decisions, the Court leads the people of the 
United States to a deeper understanding of our constitutional 
commitments. As our understanding improves, the policies we 
pursue improve as well. 
This picture of the Court's role is undeniably attractive.3 Its 
outlines need filling in, though. Claims for the Court as educator 
face an immediate difficulty. Surveys indicate rather low levels 
of public knowledge about the Court's work in general, and even 
lower levels of knowledge about particular decisions.4 How, 
then, could the Court educate the public about the true meaning 
of the Constitution? 
One possibility is that it can do so by imposing its vision on 
the society, hoping that people will adjust their understandings to 
the reality they face. As Felix Cohen put it, the Court could edu-
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Georgetown University. 
1. Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 127. 
2. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 961 {1992). 
3. Of course the account finesses hard questions about how the Justices are to find 
out what our "deep" commitments are; what appear to be deep commitments from one 
perspective will often appear to be fundamental moral errors from another. This is, 
though, a criticism available against essentially everything that anyone has ever written 
about the Supreme Court, and it may be a positive virtue to finesse the questions that 
make such a criticism cogent. 
4. See David M. O'Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics 
378 {W.W. Norton, 3d ed. 1993) ("Most of the Court's decisions attract neither media nor 
widespread public attention"); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts 
Bring About Social Change? 125-27 (U. of Chi. Press, 1991) (citing studies showing, e.g., 
that "only about 40 percent of the American public, at best, follows Supreme Court ac-
tions," and that in 1966, "46 percent of a nationwide sampling could not recall anything at 
all that the Court had recently done"). 
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cate by taking advantage of the normative power of the actual.s 
To do so, however, the Court would first have to ensure that it 
could indeed create the reality to which people would adjust. 
Yet, lacking the power of the purse or the sword, possessing only 
judgment, the Court's ability directly to coerce as the preface to 
education is limited. 
Here the reaction to the Supreme Court's flag-burning deci-
sions deserves note. As the episode ran its course, it turned out 
that the Court's decisions, however apparently unpopular, were 
not inconsistent with the views of the national political elite; no-
tably, slightly over forty percent of the members of the House of 
Representatives refused to vote for a constitutional amendment 
to overturn the Court's decisions.6 
The flag-burning decisions show the Court successfully lead-
ing and, arguably, educating the public through its decisions 
alone, for, as Christopher Eisgruber has argued, Justice Bren-
nan's opinion in Texas v. Johnson failed to achieve the rhetorical 
effect for which it strove. Eisgruber points out that in its con-
cluding rhetoric the opinion distances the Court from the deeply 
held views of those who enacted the laws against flag-burning: 
Justice Brennan "begin[s] with the oddly coy, 'We are tempted to 
say,' and conclud[es] with 'Texas sees."' This statement sepa-
rates the Court and its defense of constitutional values from the 
people of Texas.1 As Eisgruber says, Brennan's closing para-
graph, which ends by asking those who see a flag burned to sa-
lute the flag and give it a decent burial, is "well-intended, but 
ultimately ridiculous."s 
Texas v. Johnson illustrates how an opinion whose rhetoric 
fails to capture the reader's imagination can nonetheless alter re-
ality and in so doing educate the public about the Constitution. 
The Court can change reality through its decisions in several 
ways; none, however, seem to provide an adequate account of 
the Court's educative role. 
Consider first how a political adviser might describe the 
Court's situation. The adviser would learn from the Justices that 
they hold views that are different from-as they would put it, 
5. Quoted by Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the 
Due Process of Time and Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 71 (1965). 
6. The vote was 254 in favor, 177 against. 
7. Eisgruber, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 982 (cited in note 2). 
8. Id. 
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ahead of-the views prevalent in the society.9 An astute adviser 
might point out that if the Justices' views are only a bit ahead of 
society's, they might be able to educate society simply by enforc-
ing their views. They would, on this account, pull the rest of soci-
ety along, a task made easier by the relatively short distance 
society has to travel (or, in the educational metaphor, the rela-
tively small amount of learning society has to do ).10 
If, in contrast, the Justices' views are well in advance of soci-
ety's, a political adviser would probably suggest that they face a 
substantially more difficult task. If they attempt to enforce their 
views directly, they run a significant risk that what they do will be 
ignored.tt A political adviser might suggest that the Justices 
move incrementally toward the goal they prefer. After one small 
step changes reality, society may adjust by coming to accept 
views closer to the Justices'. Succeeding steps might end where 
the Justices originally began.tz 
Robert Burt has recently offered an alternative account of 
how the Court's decisions may alter reality, by keeping contend-
ing visions of the constitutional good in constant dialogue.13 The 
Court's decisions matter, according to Burt, not because the deci-
sions themselves coercively alter reality, but because they oper-
ate as signals to the public of the characteristics of acceptable 
resolutions of persistent conflict. A decision that awards a com-
plete victory to one side is, on Burt's view, unlikely to lead to 
social peace. Like violent suppression of dissent, such decisions 
9. Here "ahead of' does not mean, as it often might, "more liberal than." Con-
servatives seeking to change the views of a liberal public could properly describe them-
selves as ahead of the public. 
10. The flag-burning decisions do not fit this account directly, though they do, I 
argue below, when the role of national political elites is taken into account. 
11. The Court's aborted attempt to abolish the death penalty is probably the best 
recent example. And, it may be worth noting, the Court's 1972 decision was so highly 
fractured that the public could not know why the Court said the death penalty was uncon-
stitutional, only that the Court said so. The decision, that is, could not possibly have 
educated the public. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The example may be am-
biguous, though, because at the time the Court acted it might not have seemed to the 
Justices that they were too far ahead of the public. Public support for the death penalty 
had recently reached historic lows, and was only beginning to rise again in the early 1970s. 
Abolitionist Justices might have thought that a Court decision would contribute to the 
long-term decline in support for capital punishment. For an elegant argument that polit-
icalleadership is essential to abolition of capital punishment, see Franklin E. Zimring and 
Gordon Hawkins, Capital Punishment and the American Agenda (Cambridge U. Press, 
1986). 
12. This strategy, of course, runs the risk that it can be carried out only over a sub-
stantial period, during which the Court's membership might change. Some new members 
might not want to take further steps, or might even want to "retreat." If so, the Justices 
who sought larger changes would be thwarted from within the Court. 
13. Robert A. Burt, The Constitution in Conflict (Belknap Press, 1992). 
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forcibly shove persistent conflict beneath the surface without al-
leviating it. In contrast, by structuring its results to concede some 
validity to all sides in conflict, the Court can assist the public in 
working out a resolution of the conflict. Sometimes Burt sug-
gests that the Court provides a structure for dialogue about the 
conflict,14 but the force of his argument lies in the claim that the 
Court's contribution lies in keeping in dialogue people who 
otherwise would seek other methods of resolving their conflict.Is 
A third, and more common, explanation of the Court's edu-
cative role is that the Court educates through what it says to the 
public in its opinions. Joseph Goldstein provides a recent exam-
ple.16 He seeks a constitutional law that would be more "intelli-
gible" by being presented to the public in more readily 
understandable opinions. Intelligibility is essential, Goldstein ar-
gues, to maintain the Constitution as 
something that We can understand if We are to remain sover-
eign .... If Ours is to be an 'intelligent democracy,' ... We the 
People . . . must be able to learn, from Our reading of the 
Constitution and the Supreme Court's construction of it, what 
rights We have and do not have ... [f]or then We can meet 
14. Two difficulties with such a suggestion deserve note. Plainly dialogue about the 
positions in conflict already occurs, so the Court's decisions do no more than replace one 
structure for dialogue with another. Few if any normative conclusions can flow from such 
a substitution. And, if the Court's structure assists in resolving conflict because it has a 
normative tilt in favor of one side, the Court's contribution lies in its substantive position, 
a conclusion that Burt assiduously avoids. 
15. Among those other methods is force, and, as others have noted, one of the 
weakest points in Burt's argument is his intellectually honest insistence that the conflict 
over slavery ought to have been addressed as he suggests, by acknowledging the validity 
of the claims of slaves and slaveholders. For discussion of Burt's argument on slavery, see 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Book Review, 10 Const. Comm. 221, 224-25 (1993) (reviewing 
Burt, The Constitution in Conflict (cited in note 13)). The alternative there, of course, was 
war, and Abraham Lincoln offered the best answer to claims like Burt's: 
If we shall suppose that American Slavery is one of those offenses which, in the 
providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued through His 
appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and 
South this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall 
we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believ-
ers in a Living God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we hope-fervently do 
we pray-that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God 
wills that it continue, until all the wealth piled by the bond-man's two hundred 
and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood 
drawn with the lash, shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said 
three thousand years ago, so still it must be said 'the judgments of the Lord, are 
true and righteous altogether."' 
2 Abraham Lincoln: Speeches and Writings 687 (Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed., Library of 
America, 1989) (Second Inaugural Address). 
16. Joseph Goldstein, The Intelligible Constitution (Oxford U. Press, 1992). 
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Our responsibility as informed citizens to respond to what the 
Court did and why it did it.t7 
Goldstein argues that the Justices "have a professional obligation 
to articulate in comprehensible and accessible language the con-
stitutional principles on which their judgments rest," an obliga-
tion that he believes they have failed to honor.ts Goldstein 
recommends that the Justices adopt certain "guidelines for main-
taining the intelligibility of the Constitution," the first and pre-
sumably most important of which is, "Use simple and precise 
language 'level to the understanding of all."' Or, quoting from 
Justice Hugo Black, "Write it so your Mamma can understand 
it."l9 
Yet, if public knowledge about particular outcomes in cases 
is low, surely public knowledge of the content of the Court's 
opinions, the precise ways in which it articulates the principles it 
finds in the Constitution, is lower.zo Indeed, Goldstein's account 
seems to depend on the clearly mistaken view that the general 
public actually reads Supreme Court opinions; otherwise it seems 
nearly irrelevant whether its opinions are intelligible. Other than 
the New York Times, which sometimes reprints excerpts of major 
opinions, most newspapers provide at most a few sentences from 
opinions. The Justices can expect no more than that the public 
will know the outcomes of particularly salient cases, such as the 
flag-burning or abortion decisions, and perhaps one or two mem-
orable lines in the opinions. 
I believe that those memorable lines play an important part 
in the Court's educational effort. The memorable lines are ex-
pressions of the personalities of individual Justices in an other-
wise bureaucratic institution, who use their distinctive phrasings 
to generate a sense among opinion leaders that the Justices are 
serious people who ought to have the public's trust. 
My argument starts with the observation that the Court 
faces its most difficult educational task when it does something 
inconsistent with the judgments of the people it seeks to edu-
17. Id. at 5, 6. 
18. Id. at 19. 
19. Id. at 112. 
20. Perhaps public knowledge is low because of the turgidity of the Court's opin-
ions, and would improve if the Court changed the way in which its opinions were written. 
I find this suggestion quite implausible, if only because of the widely observed simplifica-
tion of political discourse in recent years. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, The Partial Constitu-
tion 215-16 (Harv. U. Press, 1993). No matter how hard the Justices try, they are unlikely 
to get their opinions stripped down to a ten-second sound bite (although of course, as I 
argue in the text, they may consciously attempt to insert such sound bites into their 
opinions). 
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cate-when, that is, it strikes down popular programs.21 We 
might contrast the Court with bureaucracies whose programs are 
validated by their outcomes. Because the Court's outcomes are 
unpalatable to the public when they are stated, the Court cannot 
rely on the outcomes themselves to educate the public. 
Fortunately for the Justices, neither the general public nor 
opinion leaders can devote much time to assessing the particulars 
of the Court's performance. They must rely instead on a general 
sense of what the Court has done and is doing. If the Court 
seems to be trustworthy in general, opinion leaders may be will-
ing to "cut it some slack" on decisions with which they initially 
disagree mildly. Editorials and op-ed articles may explain why 
the Court's decision actually makes sense. Conversely, if opinion 
leaders generally mistrust the Court, they may escalate their criti-
cisms precisely to limit the success the Court might otherwise 
have in educating the public to its views. 
How, then, can the Justices develop the trust which, on this 
account, is essential to their successful performance of the educa-
tive role? One method is suggested in The Federalist Papers. In 
discussing elections, Publius faced the problem of explaining how 
self-interested electors would select representatives of "the most 
attractive merit and the most diffusive and established charac-
ters" who would be more public-regarding than the voters them-
selves.zz With respect to the House of Representatives, where 
direct elections would occur, the Constitution offered the answer 
that electoral districts would be large enough to restrict the 
number of plausible candidates. To run for office, a person 
would already have to be well-known. To become well-known, in 
turn, the potential candidate would have to display his or her 
more diffusive character, generally through prior public service. 
The particular problem that concerned Publius is irrelevant 
to the Supreme Court, but the general thought is not. People 
demonstrate their character through their public actions, which 
provide the basis for evaluating their fitness for higher public of-
21. The Court has a subsidiary educational role, emphasized by Charles Black, in 
ensuring that it communicate effectively the proposition that in refusing to strike down a 
statute as unconstitutional the Court is not affirmatively approving the statute. Cf. 
Charles L. Black, Jr., The People and the Coun: Judicial Review in a Democracy 48-53 
(Macmillan, 1960) (describing "legitimating" function of judicial review); Alexander M. 
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Coun at the Bar of Politics 29-31 
(Bobbs-Merrill, 1962) (developing Black's argument). For a passage indicating the 
Court's understanding of this subsidiary role, see San Antonio School District v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1973). 
22. The Federalist No. 10 83 (James Madison) (New American Library, Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961). 
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fice. What potential Justices have done, that is, allows us to con-
sider whether we ought to place our trust in them.23 
Performance after appointment can also generate trust.24 
At this point judicial style begins to matter. Recall that the ques-
tion is how the Court can gain support for decisions that the pub-
lic may initially find troublesome or even deeply wrong. 
Precisely because the decisions are unpopular, the Court cannot 
rely on the substance of the decisions themselves to generate 
support. Rather, it has to rely on either the manner in which the 
decisions are made-their style-or the more diffuse support the 
Court has generated from other decisions that the public has al-
ready come to support. 
Here the flag-burning cases are again informative. I have 
argued that they educated by changing reality. Consider, though, 
the possibility that they educated by effectively communicating 
the Court's vision of the good constitutional order. That commu-
nication could have occurred only indirectly, because the opin-
ions were flawed stylistically. The Court's opinions were 
translated for the public by the media. The flag-burning cases 
succeeded, on this view, because editorialists and op-ed page 
commentators were able to take the results and explain why the 
Court's action was profoundly correct, at least according to the 
editorialists' understanding of the Constitution's deepest 
commitments. 
Whether or not this account of the flag-burning cases' effects 
is accurate, it suggests that often the Court educates the public 
indirectly. The general public knows some particular outcomes 
in controversial cases through the media and other opinion lead-
ers.zs Those leaders are likely to be somewhat more attentive to 
23. This may account for what seems to me a widespread sense that Supreme Court 
nominees ordinarily should have a long career in public service, so that service on the 
Court is the culmination of, or at least an extension of, their careers. Thurgood Marshall 
and Lewis Powell provide relatively recent examples. In contrast, much of the apparent 
unease about the aborted nomination of Douglas Ginsburg, some of the unease about the 
nomination of Clarence Thomas, and some of the unease about David Souter's nomina-
tion may have occurred precisely because they had not served a national constituency 
long enough to generate the trust that nominees should. See Marshall: Speaking lll of the 
Dead, Newsweek, Aug. 6, 1990, at 18 (when asked about Souter's nomination, Justice 
Marshall replied, "Never heard of him. And when his name came down, I was listening to 
television ... I called my wife and said, 'Have I ever heard of this man?'"). 
24. Of course, life tenure means that we are unable to do anything about a Justice 
who, after appointment, fails to generate trust. 
25. This argument tracks a familiar, albeit arguably outmoded, theme in the general 
political science literature about political knowledge and behavior. According to political 
scientists, political information occurs in a "'two-step flow' ... from the media to the 
attentive public ... [and then] from the attentive public to the inattentive public." James 
David Barber, Citizen Politics: An Introduction to Political Behavior 59 (Markham Pub. 
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the Court's opinions as well as to its decisions. Knowing this, 
Justices seeking to educate the public might try to capture the 
attention of opinion leaders. 
The Justices then must deal with the problem that, for better 
or worse, the Court has become one of the nation's governing 
bureaucracies. Opinion leaders know that what appears under 
the names of individual Justices are rarely the products of the 
Justice's own pen or word-processor. Surely, an opinion cannot 
carry the weight of Justice's prior public service when it is written 
by a recent law school graduate serving as the Justice's law 
clerk.26 
Here the memorable phrases matter. They are the eruptions 
of individual idiosyncracy in the otherwise bureaucratic opera-
tions of the Supreme Court.27 Whatever else media observers 
believe about the Court's opinions, they attribute these memora-
ble phrases directly to the Justices. Sometimes the memorable 
phrases are used self-consciously, as in Chief Justice Warren's re-
ported desire to have the opinion in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion written so that it would be "readable by the lay public."2s 
His statement in Reynolds v. Sims that "[l]egislators represent 
people, not trees or acres," might be criticized for its content but 
Co., 2d ed., 1972). Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social 
Change? at 126-27 (cited in note 4), argues against this claim in the specific context of civil 
rights, but not with respect to the Court's actions overall, which is my concern. 
26. This is true even though the Justice, as bureaucratic supervisor, is responsible for 
and stands behind the opinion. (A typical way to address this concern is to assert that, 
although the Justice did not draft the opinion, he or she read it with extreme care and 
made detailed editorial changes in the draft prepared by the law clerk. I believe that 
some time soon that myth will receive the same burial that the myth that Justices write 
their own opinions already has.) 
27. Of course it is easier to include such lines in separate opinions joined by no 
other Justice. The Court has developed a norm that requires deference to the stylistic 
choices made by an opinion's author. See, e.g., Warren Burger to Harry Blackmun, 
March 5, 1985 ("I regularly join opinions whose style and adjectives I don't particularly 
fancy but I 'go along' because the style is for the author of an opinion"; Justice Blackmun 
ojected to Burger's description of court of appeals' interpretation in CIA v. Sims as "crab-
bed," but Burger "consider[ed] 'crabbed' the mildest term I could use in the circum-
stances shown in this case"), Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of Congress, Box 363, 
file 6. When a Justice objects to an idiosyncratic "tone" of an opinion, however, the 
author will often remove some of the objectionable phrases. See, e.g., Harry Blackmun to 
Antonin Scalia, June 9, 1988 ("I have withheld my vote ... because the tone of the 
opinion has disturbed me somewhat .... [W]hat concerns me is the repeated criticism of 
the Ninth Circuit and its Judges"); Antonin Scalia to Harry Blackmun, June 9, 1988 (no 
one should be foreclosed from joining an opinion "solely because of its tone," and 
describing changes to be made in next version of opinion in Immigration & Naturalization 
Service v. Pangilinan), Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of Congress, Box 446, file 13. 
28. Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and 
Black America's Struggle for Equality 696 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1975). 
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not for its rhetorical power.29 Or consider here the opening sen-
tence of the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey: "Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. "3o 
This almost visibly strives for rhetorical effect, which is to say 
that its authors seem to have wanted to have the sentence 
quoted.31 
By pointing out that Court opinions educate by combining 
outcomes with memorable phrases, I suggest that style is socially 
located, like everything else.32 As Gary Peller has noted, the 
newspapers' plain style, like Goldstein's guideline regarding sim-
plicity and precision, are located in the "white, upper-middle 
class, eastern seaboard intelligentsia," and imply "that the reader 
and writer are both rational, civilized, right-thinking people, and 
that the world can be captured in common-sense, no-nonsense 
descriptions. "33 Without committing myself to the precise social 
analysis Peller offers, I believe his comments do point in the right 
direction. Because style is socially located, we ought to think 
about how the style of judicial opinions can contribute to their 
educational effect in society as it is presently constituted. What, 
that is, are the social circumstances under which judicial style 
educates? 
The Court educates the public by acting through opinion 
leaders, and memorable phrases affect the way those leaders see 
the Court. Because opinion leaders fit at least roughly Peller's 
description, quotable phrases in Supreme Court opinions will 
seem to them eminently sensible expressions of what the Consti-
tution must mean. 
It follows that what counts as a memorable line changes. 
The rhythms of John Marshall's opinions in Marbury v. 
Madison34 and Gibbons v. Ogden3s are foreign to today's read-
29. 377 u.s. 533, 562 (1964). 
30. 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992). 
31. Ironically, the evident desire to have a rhetorical effect weakens the sentence's 
actual rhetorical effect. 
32. For an earlier discussion, see Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional 
Discourse, 81 Geo. L.J. 251 (1992). 
33. Gary Peller, The Discourse of Constitutional Degradation, 81 Geo. L.J. 313, 322 
(1992). 
34. See, e.g., 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("The province of the court is, solely, 
to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive 
officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions in their nature polit-
ical, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be 
made in this court"). 
35. See, e.g., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) ("[T]he power over commerce with 
foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it 
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ers, and would be at best quaintly archaic in a contemporary 
opinion. Edmund Wilson's famous argument about the chasten-
ing of the American prose style after the Civil War tries to ex-
plain why.36 Today's newspapers' plain style communicates more 
effectively. 
Even here, though, distinctions can be made. For example, 
consider the flatness of Justice Stewart's comment on hard-core 
pornography, "I know it when I see it, and the motion picture 
involved in this case is not that."37 As Catherine MacKinnon has 
pointed out, at least in retrospect Justice Stewart's statement, 
with its explicit reliance on his own perspective ("when I see it"), 
not only fails to confront the alternative perspectives of those 
who would regulate the availability of pornography but brings 
the differences in perspective to the surface.Js And, on a differ-
ent level, the statement is memorably quotable only because 
readers elide the lumpiness of the full sentence.39 
The opening sentence in Casey provides another example of 
how quotable sentences help the Justices carry out their educa-
tional mission.40 After reading no more than that "[l]iberty finds 
no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt," readers know that the 
Court has definitively resolved the question about whether strict 
prohibitions of abortion are constitutionally permissible. The 
opinion sets itself as the defender of "liberty," providing it a "ref-
uge" by eliminating "doubt." Consider as well the images 
evoked by refuge: a haven, a comfortable resting place, a home. 
The opinion attempts to soothe controversy by describing the 
would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the 
exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States. The wisdom 
and discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their 
constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for exam-
ple, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its 
abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all represen-
tative governments"). 
36. Edmund Wilson, Patriotic Gore 635-69 (Oxford U. Press, 1966). 
37. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
38. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 
90 (Harv. U. Press, 1987). 
39. On this, compare Justice Souter's dry, "We are honored," American Nat'/ Red 
Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465,2471 n.7 (1992). The "we" here lifts the response above the 
personalized criticisms offered by Justice Scalia, evokes the royal "we" and thereby as-
serts for the Court a magisterial position, and more particularly evokes Queen Victoria's 
statement, "We are not amused," and thereby further elevates the Court above its inter-
nal critic. 
40. My comments here are indebted to a presentation by Professor Marie Ashe of 
Suffolk University Law School at the Constitutional Law Workshop of the Association of 
American Law Schools, Ann Arbor, June 1993. 
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Court itself as a refuge, removed from the controversy that sur-
rounds the abortion issue.4t 
Finally, it seems worth suggesting that today's Justices dis-
play judicial temperament by combining an overall bureaucratic 
operation with outcroppings of individualism, their quotable 
sentences. The quotable sentences show opinion leaders that a 
real person occupies a seat on the Court. The Court's more bu-
reaucratic aspects, including the dull sentences and opinions that 
predominate in the U.S. Reports, show them that the Justices are 
sober, responsible, and trustworthy people. When such people 
do something that might trouble the public, opinion leaders stand 
ready to reassure us that, because the Justices are "serious peo-
ple," we ought to dampen our discomfort with their decisions.42 
Of course, if we do not occupy the same social location that 
opinion leaders do, we might find their reassurances feeble. 
41. I note, however, that the sentence's content is belied by virtually everything that 
follows in th~ join~ opinion: a defense of stare decisis conjoined with overruling major 
cases, the arttculatiOn of a new test for determining when regulations of abortion are 
constitutionally permissible, accompanied inevitably by new doubts about the test's con-
crete meaning. 
42. Perhaps this may explain what seems to me a discomfort expressed by some with 
Justice Scalia's opinions that goes beyond mere disagreement with his results. Their occa-
sional acerbic tone, and what might be called their "mere" cleverness, may undermine the 
sense of seriousness necessary for a Justice to be an educator (beyond a relatively small 
circle of acolytes). 
